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The infamous memos that concluded that torture only existed where there
was infliction of pain equivalent in intensity to the pain "associated with a
suffiiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or
serious impairment of body functions" also concluded that "a defendant [must]
act with the peciflc intent to inflict severe pain." Specjically, "the infliction of
such pain must be the defendant's predse objective." Although this
interpretation of the intent requirement has been definitively repudiated - and
rightly so - there has thus far been little attention paid to the level of intent
that is required to prove torture under domestic and international law. This
Article aims to bring clarity to this contested and misunderstood element of the
legal definition of torture. We demonstrate that torture is a specic intent crime
under U.S. law and international law. As we shall show, moreover, the veg
definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture supplies the additional
mens rea requirement that renders the crime one of specic intent: The accused
must not only inflict pain and suffering, but he must do so for a pupose
prohibited by the Convention (for example, to extract a confession). We show
that U.S. courts and international courts and tribunals have consistently
applied this understanding of the specific intent standard for torture. In doing
so, they have not required direct evidence of mental state, but have instead
inferred intent from facts and circumstances that demonstrate knowing infliction
ofpain or suffering for a prohibited pupose. We hope that this conclusion will
help guide U.S. practice in filling the dangerous analytical void left by the
repudiated memos.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Office of
Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice issued what have since come
to be known as the infamous "torture memos." These memos concluded
that the U.S. prohibition on torture only "proscribes acts inflicting, and
that are specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering," where
"severe pain" is equivalent in intensity to the pain "associated with a
sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure,
or serious impairment of body functions."' Once leaked to the public, this
narrow definition of torture met with intense criticism. 2 Soon after he
1. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel
to the President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. S 2340-2340A, at 1, 6
(Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. This definition is drawn from a body of law intended for
emergency medical conditions, such as reimbursement of emergency medical care of aliens, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1369 (2000), or coverage under Medicare Choice plans, 42 U.S.C. 5 1395w-22 (2000). Id. at 5.
2. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT: INVESTIGATION
INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON
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entered office, President Obama repudiated all of the memos that
endorsed this exceedingly narrow definition of torture, hoping, no doubt,
to consign the episode to the dust bin of history.3
Yet for all the discussion of torture over the last decade, questions
persist about one of the key elements of the crime of torture under both
international and U.S. law: the mens rea requirement - or the mental
element of the offense. The Office of Legal Counsel memo that
interpreted "severe pain" to be equivalent in intensity to the pain of
"death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions" also
concluded that "a defendant [must] act with the specific intent to inflict
severe pain." 4 To satisfy this mens rea requirement, the memo argued, "the
infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise objective." 5
Consequently, "even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result
from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the
requisite specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good
faith." 6 Under this standard, if the accused knowingly causes pain or
suffering but had some other objective for which pain and suffering was
merely incidental, such as extracting information, he lacks the requisite
"specific intent."
Although the Bush-era memos' interpretation of the prohibition on
torture has been definitively repudiated,7 there has thus far been little
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 43-46 (2009) (describing Yoo's drafting process and referring to the
memorandum as the "bad things opinion").
3. In 2009, the Administration revoked the memos. See infra note 7. In addition, the United
States, in response to the United Nations Human Rights Council, stated, "the United States is
unequivocally committed to the humane treatment of all individuals in detention." U.N. Human
Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States of
America, 31, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/16/11 gan. 4, 2011). Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of
State Harold Koh reiterated this commitment when discussing the many steps President Obama's
Administration had taken to ensure an end to torture, including revoking "the Justice Department
OLC opinions that had permitted practices that [he] consider[s] to be torture and cruel treatment."
Harold Hongju Ko, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at http://tinyur.com/87on3k5).
4. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 3. This definition is drawn from a body of law intended for
emergency medical conditions, such as reimbursement of emergency medical care of aliens, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1369 (2000), or coverage under Medicare Choice plans, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (2000). Id. at 5.
5. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. In 2004, a memorandum by then-Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin superseded
the 2002 memorandum authored by Bybee and Yoo in its entirety and stepped back from some of its
analysis on presidential authority. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, on Legal Standards Applicable under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 2 (Dec. 30, 2004). It also repudiated the 2002 specific intent analysis:
We do not believe it is useful to try to define the precise meaning of 'specific intent' in
5 2340. In light of the President's directive that the United States not engage in torture, it
would not be appmpriate to rrly on parsing the specific intent element of the statute to approve as lawful
conduct that might otherwise amount to torture.
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attention paid to the clarifying the level of intent that is required to prove
torture under domestic or international law. Even today, the definition of
torture is still very much contested, with some praising the Bush-era
"aggressive interrogation techniques" and others decrying them as illegal
torture.8
This Article aims to bring clarity to this contested and misunderstood
element of the legal definition of torture. We focus here in particular on
the mens rea requirement for torture under international law -
particularly under the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against
Torture, or CAT). This is important not only to clarify the United States'
international obligations, but also to clarify the scope of the domestic law
prohibition on torture.9
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with the text of the
key authoritative document - the Convention Against Torture, which the
United States has ratified - and that Convention's negotiating history.
Article 1 of the Convention includes intent as one of several defining
elements of torture. 10 Specifically, it defines torture as "any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionaly inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession" or another prohibited purpose "by or at the
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). In a January 22, 2009, Executive Order, President Obama revoked
"[a]ll executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not
limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to
January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals . . . ." Exec.
Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 5 3(c) (an. 22, 2009) (stating that these memos were revoked
"in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering, to promote the safe, lawful,
and humane treatment of individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel who
are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States,
including the Geneva Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully
executed"). Two additional documents are part of what are sometimes collectively referred to as the
"torture memos" of the Bush Administration: a memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also signed by Jay Bybee, and a letter from John
Yoo to then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, on
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002); Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002). Both were
understood to be included in the 2009 Executive Order.
8. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Bin Laden Dead, Torture Debate Lives On, NEW YORKER, May 2, 2011,
available at http://tinyurl.com/3rlrpwj.
9. Even the 2002 memo acknowledged that the Convention's text and history were directly
relevant to the proper interpretation of the United States' implementing legislation, noting that
"Congress intended for the statute's definition to track the Convention's definition of torture and the
reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States submitted with its ratification."
Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at
http://tinvur.com/7ceyghn [hereinafter CAT].
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instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a . .. person acting in
an official capacity." 1' We examine the commentary on the meaning of this
text, as well as the generally understood meaning of the language at the
time it was written, based on the travaux of the Convention. Both make
clear that the accused need not act with the exclusive objective (or
purpose) of causing pain or suffering to be guilty of torture, as the torture
memos suggest. Rather, the accused must intentionally inflict pain or
sufferingfor a prohibited purpose. It is this prohibited purpose - specified in
the Convention text - that turns an act into torture, and it is this
prohibited purpose that renders torture a specific intent crime under
international law.
Part II discusses the Convention's intent requirement as interpreted in
U.S. law and applied by U.S. courts. The United States discussed a
"specific intent" requirement during the Convention's drafting and
included it in an Understanding attached to the Convention.12 A complete
picture of the legislative history indicates that the U.S. Understanding
clarifies, rather than changes, the intent requirement in the Convention.'3
The existing U.S. jurisprudence interpreting torture largely confirms this
view. This jurisprudence also clarifies the proof required to establish the
intent requirement for torture, because it consistently allows intent to be
established based on the attendant circumstances. In a federal case
interpreting the federal statute implementing the Convention, for example,
one court found that acts of "extraordinary cruelty and evil" constituted
torture under the U.S. law without conducting a separate intent analysis. 4
Similarly, U.S. courts have inferred intent to torture from the totality of the
circumstances in cases in which an alien is suing for civil damages under
the Alien Tort Statute15 or the Torture Victims Protection Act.16
Part III examines the Committee Against Torture's (Committee)
application of the intent standard. The Committee's interpretation
comports with the U.S. substantive specific intent standard and with the
11. Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
12. See CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, at 14 (1990); MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. TREATY DoC. 100-
20, at 3 (1988) [hereinafter Message on CAT].
13. See Convention Against Torture: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 9-10
(1990) [hereinafter Convention Hearing]. The United States came under criticism for what was seen
by some as an attempt to change the severe pain requirement through its Understanding, but no
criticism was raised due to an apparent change in the intent requirement. Id.
14. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cit. 2010).
15. See Filittiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); rC Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 738 (2004) (not finding torture due to a lack of a violation of a customary international law
norm, rather than due to a lack of specific intent).
16. See Ortiz v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995).
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U.S. courts' requirements for proof of intent. On the latter point, the
Committee makes clear that intent can be inferred from the actions of the
accused and the circumstances in which they were made. Indeed, in
reviewing complaints,17 the Committee rarely discusses intent separately;
like the U.S. courts, it presumes intent based on the facts and
circumstances of the complaint. Put simply, where the facts show that
severe pain or suffering was knowingly inflicted on a person with the
acquiescence of a public official for a purpose prohibited by the
Convention,18 the Committee concludes that the intent requirement is
satisfied. In no instance has the Committee considered it necessary to
conduct an intent analysis separate from its examination of these facts and
circumstances) 9 The Committee has applied a similar approach in its
concluding observations to country reports and country-specific
inquiries. 20 In this context, the Committee has detailed a list of acts that
constitute torture, such as prolonged sleep deprivation and violent shaking,
from which intent can be inferred. We therefore conclude that Committee
employs a specific intent standard similar to that of the U.S. courts. And
like U.S. courts, the Committee does not require direct evidence of intent;
it instead infers mens rea based on the totality of the facts and
circumstances.
Part IV considers how international courts and tribunals approach
claims of torture. Given the relatively small amount of jurisprudence
examining the definition of intent under the Convention, the jurisprudence
of international tribunals (albeit interpreting torture under their own
statutes rather than under the Convention) offers a useful reference point
for understanding intent to torture under international law - and how
that intent may be proven in courts and tribunals.21 We find that like the
17. Complaints are the Committee's adjudicatory equivalent to court cases.
18. Hereinafter described simply as a "prohibited purpose."
19. For all of the cases in which the Committee has determined torture has been committed, see
Ali v. Tunisia, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/41/D/291/2006, Decision, 7.1 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture
Nov. 26, 2008); Dimitrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/35/D/172/2000,
Decision, T 7.1 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture Nov. 16, 2005); Dimitrov v. Serbia and Montenegro,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/171/2000, Decision, 7.1 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture May 23, 2005);
Dimitrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/D/207/2002, Decision, 5.3 (U.N.
Comm. Against Torture Nov. 29, 2004); Falcon Rios v. Canada, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/33/D/133/1999, Decision, 8.4 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture Nov. 23, 2004).
20. Concluding observations are the Committee's responses to reports filed by individual
countries on the status of their Convention obligations under Article 19. The Committee also is
"empowered to carry out a confidential inquiry if it receives reliable information which appears to it
to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in a State party"
under Convention Article 20. CAT, supra note 10, art. 20; U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Confidential Inquiries Under Article 20 of the Convention against Torture,
http://tinyurl.com/7gheshn (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
21. This examination is not exhaustive within the courts and tribunals, or for tribunals as a
whole - for example, the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and
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U.S. courts and the Committee, international tribunals apply a specific
intent standard. And like U.S. courts and the Committee, international
tribunals find the specific intent requirement is met in cases where the
facts and circumstances demonstrate there has been infliction of pain or
suffering for a prohibited purpose. For example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found that it is sufficient
to show that the accused inflicted pain and suffering for the purpose of
obtaining information or a confession.22 Similarly, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has determined torture occurred
when severe harm has been inflicted for a prohibited purpose, such as
investigation 23 or discrimination. 24 The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) has found that intent is satisfied when the "treatment," in this
case being hung naked by his arms with his arms tied behind his back,
"could only have been deliberately inflicted" and where it was
"administered with the aim of obtaining admissions or information from
the applicant." 25 Finally, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) has concluded intention was satisfied by a showing that
the act - in this case, rape - inflicted pain or suffering for a prohibited
purpose, including "personal punishment and intimidation." 26
This Article concludes, therefore, that the torture memos err not in
describing torture as a specific intent crime, but in their description of the
Political Rights has addressed the definition of torture under on Article 7 of the Covenant. See
Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20: Article 7 prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or
punishment (Mar. 10, 1992), pubdfbed in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7 (May
12, 2004).
22. Prosecutor v. Furund'ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 114 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (rejecting an improper finding of torture as a grounds for appeal).
The ICTY combined the intent and purpose requirements into a single inquiry: "the accused 'must
participate in an integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose behind the torture, that is the
intent to obtain information or a confession, to punish or intimidate, humiliate, coerce or
discriminate against the victim or a third person." Id. 118 (quoting Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998),
available at http://tinyurl.com/6lr32cj).
23. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, f 682-83 (Sept. 2, 1998). The
Trial Chamber also commented:
On the issue of determining the offender's specific intent, the Chamber considers that
intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. This is the reason
why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a
certain number of presumptions of fact.
Id. T 523.
24. Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 545 (May 15,
2003).
25. Fimnd'fa, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 114 (rejecting an improper finding of torture
as grounds for appeal); see supra note 22.
26. Martin de Mejia v. Pern, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No 5/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 (1996).
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meaning and significance of that conclusion. The negotiating history of the
Convention, the plain meaning of the text, domestic jurisprudence on
torture, the Committee Against Torture's interpretations, and international
court and tribunal case law all make clear, first, that torture under
international law is a specific intent crime, and second, that the specific
intent standard for torture is met by evidence that the accused knowingly
inflicted severe pain or suffering on a person for a prohibited purpose.
Proof of that intent may, moreover, be inferred from the total facts and
circumstances of the case and does not require direct evidence of the
accused's mental state. In light of the repudiated torture memos and the
blow they delivered to the United States' reputation as a human rights
leader, the United States should reaffirm that it shares the understanding
of the intent requirement for torture that is held by all other bodies that
have considered the matter. This would be an important step toward
reaffirming the United States' commitment to end torture and bolstering
respect for the Convention, particularly in the context of the ongoing fight
against terrorism.
I. THE CONVENTION TEXT AND HISTORY
A. Codifcation and Plain Meaning
We begin with the text of the Convention Against Torture.27 Adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1984, the Convention entered
into force in June 1987. The United States ratified it in 1994.28 The
Convention penalizes acts of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment in States Parties, aiming to "make more effective the struggle
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world."29 Article 1 of the Convention defines
torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
27. As stated in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
28. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, http://tinyur.com/ccr7bc9 (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
29. CAT, supra note 10. The prohibition on torture has been widely accepted as customary
international law and jus cogens. See, e.g., Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cit. 1980)
(stating that the "prohibition [on torture] has become part of customary international law, as
evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); Furund'ia, Case No. IT-95-




obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. 30
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture thus codifies four necessary
elements for an action to constitute torture: (1) infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental; (2) with intent; (3) for a purpose
prohibited by the Convention;31 and (4) by a public official or with an
official's involvement or acquiescence. 32
The requirement that the infliction of severe pain or suffering must be
"intentional" indicates that merely negligent conduct does not, without
more, amount to torture. As one commentary put it, "[t]his seems to imply
the exclusion of negligent conduct from the application of Article 1."33 In
2010, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment offered an example to highlight
the distinction between negligence and intent:
A detainee who is forgotten by the prison officials and suffers from
severe pain due to the lack of food is without doubt the victim of a
severe human rights violation. However, this treatment does not
amount to torture given the lack of intent by the authorities. On the
other hand, if the detainee is deprived of food for the purpose of
extracting certain information, that ordeal, in accordance with
article 1, would qualify as torture.34
The intention, as highlighted above, must be "directed at the conduct of
inflicting severe pain or suffering as well as at the purpose to be achieved
30. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1 (emphasis added).
31. Hereinafter described simply as a "prohibited" or "proscribed" purpose.
32. See Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Report on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Human
Rights Council, 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 (Feb. 5, 2010) (prepared by Manfred Nowak)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report].
33. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 41 (1988); see GAIL H. MILLER,
DEFINING TORTURE 13 (2005); MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY Article 1, 39, 29 (2008)
[hereinafter Commentary].
34. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 32, T 34 (emphasis added).
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by such conduct."35 In this scenario, the actor must have intended the
severe pain or suffering that resulted from depriving a detainee of food,
and he must have done so for the purpose of extracting information (or
some other prohibited purpose that falls within the scope of Article 1).
Pain or suffering arising "ony from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions," such as detention or incarceration facilities, does not constitute
torture.36 By contrast, "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment" - which is also criminalized under the Convention - is a
general intent crime. Whereas torture occurs where the torturer
"deliberately inflicts severe pain or suffering on a powerless victim for a
specific purpose, such as extracting a confession or information from the
victim," 37 cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment "means
the infliction of pain or suffering without purpose or intention."38
Much of the debate over the Convention's intent standard for torture
centers on whether torture is properly understood as a specific intent
crime - and, if so, how that standard can be met. To answer this
question, it is first necessary to understand the concept of specific intent.39
Specific intent is most commonly used "to designate a special mental
element that is required above and beyond any mental state required with
35. Commentary, supra note 33, at 74, 107.
36. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1 (emphasis added).
37. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 32, 188. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-
96-21-T, judgment, T 442 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). The
prohibited purposes commonly recognized within the scope or Article 1 include extracting a
confession, obtaining information from the victim or a third person, punishment, intimidation and
coercion, and discrimination. But this list is not considered exhaustive. Commentary, supra note 33, at
75, 112. For secondary literature on purpose and intent to commit torture, see, for example, Mary
Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection Under the Convention Against Torture,
88 OR. L. REv. 777 (2009).
38. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 32, 188.
39. Indeed, much of the confusion in this debate stems from confusion not about the crime of
torture, but about the relevant intent standards. The Model Penal Code in the United States long ago
abandoned the "specific intent" language for a five-part classification of intent, in significant part
because the concept of specific intent was regarded as confusing. The Code now classifies crimes
into five categories of mens rea: (1) crimes requiring intention (or purpose) to do the forbidden act or
cause the forbidden result, (2) crimes requiring knowledge of the nature of the act or the result that will
follow, (3) crimes requiring recklessness in doing the act, (4) crimes requiring neghgence, or (5) crimes for
which the mental state is irrelevant - for which the actor is strictly liable. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 cmt. 1 (2011); MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 62-82 (2002);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 160 (2d ed. 2010). Although the Code had
abandoned the concept of specific intent, courts still regularly resort to it, particularly in jurisdictions
that have not adopted the Code. Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2053 (2011) (noting that it
is "a federal crime 'to kill another person, with intent to ... prevent the communication by any
person to a law enforcement officer .. .of the United States of information relating to the
commission or possible commission of a Federal offense,"' and observing that, "[v]iewed in isolation,
this provision contains an ambiguity: Does the mens rea of the statute include a specific intent to
prevent communication to a law enforcement officer ofthe United States; or is it satisfied by the mere
intent to prevent communication to a law enforcement officer who happens to be a law enforcement
officer of the United States?").
[Vol. 52:791
TORTURED REASONING
respect to the actus reus of the crime." 40 The distinction between general
or basic intent (which does not require this special mental element) and
specific intent (which does) was helpfully outlined by Lord Simon of the
British House of Lords in DPP v. Morgan. He explained that crimes of
basic intent (sometimes also referred to as general intent) are "those crimes
whose definition expresses (or, more often, implies) a mens rea which does
not go beyond the actus reus."41 Assault is an example. The actus reus
element of the offence is an act that causes another person to apprehend
immediate and unlawful violence. The mens rea requirement necessitates
nothing more than that the actus reus is volitional. In crimes of specific
intent, on the other hand, "mens rea goes beyond contemplation of the actus
reus."42 The prosecution must show that the accused "acted with whatever
specific intent is required by the definition of the subject offense." 43 For
example, common-law burglary requires breaking and entering into the
dwelling of another (actus reus) with intent to commit a felony therein
(additional mens rea). Hence, burglary requires more than intent to
commit the actus reus. Moreover, that additional mens rea requirement is
specifically identified in the elements of the offense.
Applying this framework to the crime of torture, it is evident that
torture under the Convention Against Torture is a specific intent crime -
for both the act and state of mind are essential elements of the crime. The
very definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture supplies the
additional mens rea requirement: The accused must not only intend to
inflict pain and suffering, but he must do so for a purpose prohibited by the
Convention (for example, to extract a confession). To satisfy this
requirement, however, causing such harm need not be the accused's
objective or purpose. Rather, the specific intent standard for torture is met
by evidence that the accused intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering
on a person for a prohibited purpose, as provided by the Convention (for
example, in order to extract information).
To establish that a person accused of torture has the requisite purpose,
it is not necessary to show that the forbidden purpose was actually
realized - for example, that the interrogation was successful. It is only
necessary to show that the accused "consciously desire[d] the forbidden
result, whatever the likelihood of that result actually occurring from the
40. LAFAVE, .upra note 39, at 178-79. Notably, the language does not appear in the U.S. Model
Penal Code, which rejects the common law approach to intent. The Code "establishes four levels of
culpable criminal intent ranging, in order, from the most culpable to the least culpable level;
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent." FRANK AUGUST SCHUBERT, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
BASICS 157 (2d ed. 2010).
41. Kenneth J. Arenson, The Pifals in the Law ofAtterpt: A New Perspectire, 69 J. CRIM. L. 146, 150
(2005) (quoting DPP v. Morgan, [1976] AC 182 at 216-17, 1975 WL 44975).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 151.
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conduct." 44 Moreover, the Committee has explained that establishing
intent and purpose does not involve a "subjective inquiry into the
motivations of the perpetrators." 45 Instead, it simply requires "objective
determinations under the circumstances." 46
Consider a doctor who inflicts severe pain and suffering during a
standard medical procedure. If that procedure is performed for the sole
purpose of addressing a medical condition, it would not be torture,
because the doctor's actions lack the prohibited purpose required by
Article 1 and would therefore not satisfy the specific intent requirement.
But a doctor who inflicts severe pain and suffering during that same
medical procedure (by, for example, needlessly withholding pain
medication) for the purpose of extracting a confession from the patient
would have the requisite specific intent.
Criminal law not only distinguishes between general and specific intent,
but often further distinguishes between different mental states in a more
fine-grained way. The U.S. Model Penal Code, for example, distinguishes
between acting "purposely" ("it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result"), "knowingly" ("he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist"),
"recklessly" ("he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct"), and
"negligently" ("he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct").47 This
more fine-grained delineation of mental state can cause particular
confusion in the context of torture because torture requires pain or
suffering be "intentionally inflicted on a person" for a proscribed purpose.
One might mistakenly conclude that the requirement that pain or suffering
be "intentionally inflicted" must meet the purposeful intent standard
independent of the prohibited purpose requirement. Reading the statute as
a whole, however, it is clear that it is sufficient that the accused
intentionally inflict pain or suffering if that pain or suffering is inflicted for
a prohibited purpose. Knowingly, not recklessly or negligently, is the
applied intent standard. In other words, purpose need not be read into the
requirement that pain or suffering be "intentionally inflicted" because it is
explicitly provided for in the further requirement that the pain or suffering
be inflicted for a prohibited "purpose."
44. Holper, supra note 37, at 791.
45. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation ofArnicle 2 by State Parties,
9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (an. 24, 2008).
46. Id.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.02(2) (2011).
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B. Negotiating History and Commentag
The Convention's negotiating history - its travaux prejparatoires -
provides guidance as to participating country priorities and the collective
intended meaning of the Convention's text.48 Together, the documents
support the above reading of the plain meaning of the text - that the
Convention provides for a specific intent standard.
Before negotiation and ratification of the Convention, the U.N. General
Assembly first unanimously adopted the Declaration Against Torture
(Declaration).49 The Declaration stated that torture "involves the infliction
of severe physical or mental pain or suffering," and that "[t]he infliction of
pain is intentional and must be at the instigation of a public official."50 The
Declaration also highlighted that the conduct must "serve[] specific
purposes, such as obtaining information or a confession."51 Although non-
binding, the Declaration ultimately provided much of the substance that
later was incorporated into the Convention Against Torture. In fact, the
Swedish draft of the Convention, which formed the basis of the
negotiations, used the exact text of the definition of torture from the
Declaration.52
Much of the discussion among participating country delegates focused
on the difference between torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. Ultimately, the delegates distinguished torture from inhuman
and degrading treatment in large part by "the essential aspect of the objective
for which someone is subjected to inhuman treatment, such as obtaining
information or a confession, or the execution of a punishment" - the
purpose of the act.53 Perhaps as revealing as what was said is what was not
said: Little discussion or debate centered on the issue of intent
independent of the purpose of the act.
To the extent that the intent standard entered the discussion, it led to
rejection of a heightened standard. At one point during negotiations, the
United States proposed that torture include only an act by which "extreme
48. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 32, the preparatory work
of the treaty and the circumstances in which it was concluded serve as a supplementary means of
interpretation when language "(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. In this instance, given that the United States' positions since ratification
has been at odds with the plain meaning of the treaty's text, we now turn to the negotiating history as
a supplemental means of understanding the Convention.
49. CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 69-70 (2001).
50. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 74. Unfortunately, the draft Sweden submitted to the 34th Session, E/CN.4/1285, is
not available on the U.N. Documents database.
53. Id. at 58, 70.
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pain or suffering . .. is deliberately and maliciously inflicted on a person." 54
This would have replaced the "intentional infliction" requirement with a
requirement of "deliberate" and "malicious" infliction of "extreme" pain
or suffering. This U.S. proposal, however, elicited little discussion by the
Working Group; no other state commented on it, and ultimately the
proposal failed.55 Similarly, a proposal by the United Kingdom that the
pain not only be intentionally, but also "systematically" inflicted also
failed. 56 The Convention consequently went into force with the original
requirement of "intentionally inflicted" pain or suffering for a proscribed
purpose. 5
The "purpose" requirement is further informed by the travaux. Article 1
provides that pain or suffering must be inflicted
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind.58
It thus provides that conduct must be carried out for the purpose of
achieving a specific result and contains a non-exhaustive list of objectives.
At the time of adoption, the United Kingdom suggested that the definition
would be more precise if the prohibited purposes were listed rather than
exemplified in Article 1. The Swiss delegation objected to that proposal on
the grounds that a list would inevitably exclude certain actions meant to be
prohibited. France went even further, insisting that:
torture should not be defined in terms of the status and motives of
the perpetrators of acts of torture owing to the fact that this
reference might afford States parties a means of evading their
commitment to prevent or punish all acts of torture regardless of
the identity and goals of the perpetrators.5 9
The final text of this portion of the definition can thus be understood to
require a particular motive, objective, or goal - hence, it requires a mens
rea (a proscribed purpose) that goes beyond the actus reus (volitional
infliction of pain or suffering).
54. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 41; Commentary, supra note 33.
55. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 46; Commentary, supra note 33.
56. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 46; Commentary, supra note 33.
57. CAT, supra note 10. The United States ratified the Convention with a Reservation "that with
reference to [A]rticle 1, the United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must
be specifically intended . . . ." Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or
Succession [United States], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994). As a result, the United States is bound
under international law only by what it announced was a specifc intent standard.
58. CAT, supra note 10.
59. Commentary, supra note 33, at 40, 31.
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The text and negotiating history of the Convention thus support the
conclusion that the intent requirement for torture does not require that
causing pain or suffering need not be the accused's objective or purpose.
Instead, the accused must intentionally (knowingly, not negligently or
recklessly) inflict pain or suffering. That pain or suffering, moreover, must
be inflicted for a prohibited purpose. It is this prohibited purpose -
debated by the States Parties to the Convention at its inception and
expressly delineated in the final text of the Convention itself- that turns
an act into torture, and this prohibited purpose that renders torture a
specific intent crime under international law.
II. UNITED STATES: LAW, HISTORY,JURISPRUDENCE
U.S. legislative history and jurisprudence demonstrate that U.S. courts
have applied the same specific intent standard provided for in the
Convention Against Torture, and the same evidentiary requirements as
international courts and tribunals. U.S. domestic courts have held that acts
of "extraordinary cruelty and evil" 60 constitute torture when inflicted for a
prohibited purpose. This understanding of intent under the Convention is
reflected by the legislative history of the U.S. ratification and the
implementing legislation passed by Congress, as well as the single criminal
prosecution in U.S. courts under the implementing legislation. This intent
has, moreover, been inferred from the circumstances of the case and thus
has not required direct evidence as to the accused's mental state. This is
true in criminal prosecutions under the U.S. implementing legislation for
the Convention Against Torture, in cases in which immigrants are
challenging deportation, and in cases involving the Alien Tort Statute. To
the extent there are differences across these different bodies of domestic
law interpreting the prohibition on torture, they go to the evidence
required to establish intent, rather than to the standard of intent itself.
Hence, U.S. case law conforms to the above reading of the plain text of
the Convention and, as we shall see in Parts III and IV, to the
jurisprudence of international bodies that have addressed the issue.
A. Legislative History and Implementing Legislation
The ratifying instrument of the Convention and its implementing
legislation came into force at the same time.61 As a result, the legislative
60. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010).
61. The implementing legislation is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Section 2340A provides:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any
person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
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history of the Senate's consent to the Convention and to the implementing
statute, as well as contemporaneous commentary from the State
Department, provide a window into the U.S.'s understanding of the
Convention at the time of ratification. This examination reveals that while
specific intent is mentioned in both the treaty and the statute's legislative
history, it was not a significant focus of debate in the Senate or in
Congress as a whole. Rather than alter its meaning, the Understanding
entered by the United States at the time it ratified appears to have been
meant to clarify the meaning of intent under the Convention.
In 1988, President Reagan's letter of transmittal of the Convention
Against Torture to the Senate urged the Senate to consent to ratification of
the Convention, subject to certain reservations, understandings, and
declarations, in order to "clearly express the United States' opposition to
torture, an abhorrent practice," and "establish a regime for international
cooperation in the criminal prosecution of torturers." 62 George P. Shultz,
the Secretary of State at the time, explained to the Senate that the United
States had contributed significantly to the development of the Convention,
especially in directing the Convention to "focus on torture rather than on
other relatively less abhorrent practices." 63 The Senate did not give its
approval at that time, but rather continued to debate the language of the
proposed reservations, understandings, and declarations.
Among the provisions under debate was an "Understanding" stating
that an act of torture "must be speaificaly intended to inflict severe physical
or mental pain or suffering." 64 The Committee on Foreign Relations
Hearing Report on the Convention noted that the original U.S.
understandings submitted by the Reagan Administration had come under
criticism for raising the bar on the pain required for an act to constitute
torture.
The United States' Understanding that an act of torture must be
"specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering"
was not meant to modify the treaty standard of intent. As U.N. Special
Rapporteur Manfred Nowak argues, the Understanding did not "go
beyond the requirement of intention" stipulated in Article 1 itself.65
18 U.S.C. 5 2340A (2006). Section 2340 defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody
or physical control." Id. 5 2340. The language thus directly tracks the Understanding.
62. Message on CAT, supra note 12, at iii,
63. Id. at v.
64. Commentary, supra note 33, at 74, 106 (emphasis added). The United Kingdom introduced
a proposal that the pain must only be intentionally inflicted, but that it must also be inflicted
"systematically." Id. at 74, 108. This proposal also was rejected, with the result that single, isolated
acts can be considered torture under the Convention. Id. at 39, 29.
65. Id. at 74,1106.
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Indeed, Abraham D. Sofaer, the State Department Legal Adviser at the
time, defended the Understanding at the time as a simple interpretation of
the treaty, not an effort to modify it. He explained, "the original
[transmittal] package proposed an understanding to the effect that, in
order to constitute 'torture,' 'an act must be a deliberate and calculated act
of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict
excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering."' 66
Although "this proposal was criticized as possibly setting a higher, more
difficult evidentiary standard than the Convention required," 67 he
explained that "no higher standard was intended," and that the proposed
Understanding did "not raise the high threshold of pain already required
under international law." 68 Instead, he explained, the first transmittal
package reflected a U.S. desire to clarify the definition of torture to allow
more effective criminal prosecution under U.S. law.69
The U.S. instrument of ratification for the Convention was deposited
on October 21, 1994.70 No country expressly objected to the U.S.
Understanding, suggesting that the States Parties regarded the
Understanding to be consistent with the Convention's requirements. 7 1 The
U.S. Congress enacted a law implementing the Convention's
66. Convention Hearing, supra note 13, at 9.
67. Id. at 9-10.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id. This position was consistent with the proposal of the provision as an "Understanding"
rather than as a "Reservation." Whereas a Reservation alters a country's treaty obligations, an
Understanding states the member country's interpretation of the agreement as written.
70. Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or Succession, supra note
57.
71. Finland objected to the U.S. Reservation to Article 16 (restricting the U.S. obligation to
prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"). Declarations and Reservations
Made upon Ratification, Accession, or Succession [Finland], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Feb. 27, 1996). The
Netherlands also objected to the reservation regarding Article 16, as well as to part II(1)(a) of the
Understanding, on the grounds that it "appears to restrict the scope of the definition of torture under
Article 1 of the Convention." Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or
Succession [Netherlands], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Feb. 26, 1996). Part I1(l)(a) of the U.S. Understanding
does mention intent, but it also expressly limits the scope of "mental pain or suffering" to which the
convention reaches. Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or Succession
[United States], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994). It is likely that it is this later limitation to which
the Netherlands was referring. Sweden also objected to the reservation regarding Article 16, and
expressed the view that "the understandings expressed by the United States of America do not
relieve the United States of America as a party to the Convention from the responsibility to fulfil the
obligations undertaken therein." Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession,
or Succession [Sweden], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Feb. 27, 1996). Finally, on February 26, 1996, the
Government of Germany notified the Secretary-General that with respect to the U.S. reservations
under I(1) and understandings under 11(2) and (3), "it is the understanding of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany that [the said reservations and understandings] do not touch upon the
obligations of the United States of America as State Party to the Convention." Declarations and
Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or Succession, 1830 U.N.T.S. 320, n.23 (Feb. 26,
1996).
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requirements - entitled the "Torture Act" 72 - shortly thereafter, and the
treaty entered into force thirty days later.73
The Senate Executive Report accompanying the new Torture Act
explained that torture must be "an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment, must cause severe pain and suffering, and must be intended to
cause severe pain and suffering."74 The Report explained that "[b]ecause
specific intent is required, an act that results in unanticipated and unintended
severity of pain and suffering is not torture for the purposes of this
Convention."7 5 Finally, the Report noted that the "requirement of intent is
emphasized in Article 1 by reference to illustrative motives for torture." 76
This history suggests that the Senate understood that torture under the
Torture Act would require specific intent, and that specific intent was
properly understood to mean that severe pain and suffering must be
knowingly (not unintentionally) inflicted for a prohibited purpose.
Although the specific intent text of the statute differs from the intent
standard articulated in the Convention, the Senate ratifying history, the
Understanding, and the implementing statute demonstrate a consistent
belief among participants that the United States was clarifying, not altering,
the Convention intent standard.
The question of intent under the Torture Act and the Convention was
not in significant dispute until 2002, when the Department of Justice
issued the controversial memoranda discussed above. In 2000, for
example, the first U.S. submission to the U.N. Committee Against Torture
did not mention intent in its discussion of Article 1.77 Even in 2002 and
thereafter, the issue received little public attention. In 2002, the D.C.
Circuit explained that there were two ambiguities in the definition of
torture raised in the drafting history of the Convention and of the statute,
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006).
73. The Torture Act was enacted on April 30, 1994, and amended on September 13, 1994.
18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006). It became effective on Nov. 20, 2994, the day the United States became a
party to the Convention. Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 463, 464 (1994); see United States v.
Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007) (describing the
relationship between ratification and the Torture Act).
74. S. REP. 101-30, supra note 12, at 6.
75. Id. at 14 (emphasis added); see also Message on CAT, supra note 12, at 3 (using virtually
identical terms).
76. S. REP. 101-30, supra note 12, at 14; see also Message on CAT, supra note 12, at 3-4 (using
virtually identical terms). At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing discussing the
Convention, Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser under George H.W. Bush, told the
committee that "there is no need for the legal protections of the Convention Against Torture in the
United States. Existing U.S. law makes any act falling within the Convention's definition of torture a
criminal offense.... We do not have a torture problem within the United States." Convention
Hearing, supra note 13, at 5.
77. United States of America, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
19 of the Convention, TT 94-99, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb 9, 2000).
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but did not list the definition of "intentionally" as among them.78 In the
second U.S. submission to the Committee in 2005 and in subsequent
discussions with the Committee, the United States focused on the claim
that the Convention does not apply in wartime rather than on the meaning
of the specific intent requirement.79 This suggests that the torture memos
were outliers and that the past and present U.S. interpretation of the intent
standard by key political actors has generally been consistent with the
international understanding. We now turn to the courts.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the U.S. Implementing Statute for the Convention
The United States implemented part of its obligations under the
Convention Against Torture by passing a federal statute to make torture a
crime.80 This federal statute states that "'torture' means an act committed
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or
physical control."81
The crime of torture in the United States has been criminally prosecuted
only once.82 The complaint was lodged against Charles Emmanuel, the son
78. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cit. 2002).
79. John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor to U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at U.S. Meeting with U.N.
Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), available at http://tinyurl.com/7adwxxs; U.S. Response to
Specific Recommendations Identified by the Committee Against Torture (Jul. 25, 2007), at 7, available
at http://tinyurl.com/7zjeykb ("The law of war, and not the Convention, is the applicable legal
framework governing these detentions."). This is consistent with the United States' position during
the drafting of the Convention. The negotiator stated that the Convention:
never intended to apply to armed conflicts and thus supersede the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on humanitarian law in armed conflicts and the 1977 Protocols additional
thereto. He stated his further understanding that incidents covered by the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols thereto would not fall within the scope of the convention
against torture and that to consider otherwise would result in an overlap of the different
treaties, which would undermine the objective of eradicating torture.
Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group, 40th Sess., T 5, E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9,
1984).
80. 18 U.S.C. 5 2340A (2006).
81. 18 U.S.C. 5 2340(2). The statute defines "severe mental pain or suffering" as:
The prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from -
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical
pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
82. A November 6, 2010, search on Westlaw revealed sixty-six cases citing 18 U.S.C. 5 2340, fifty-
five of which reference "torture." The rest of the cases concern immigration proceedings, brutality in
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of the former president of Liberia and indicted war criminal, Charles
Taylor.83 The indictment alleges that Emmanuel "repeatedly shocked the
victim's genitalia and other body parts," 84 burned the victim's flesh, and
rubbed salt into the wounds,85 with the intention to "to obtain information
from the alleged victim about actual, perceived, or potential opponents of
the Taylor presidency." 86
At the trial, Emmanuel did not dispute the factual allegations against
him or the finding on specific intent, but instead raised a range of
procedural and constitutional concerns about the Torture Act itself.87 At
the district level, the jury found him guilty.88 In his appeal, Emmanuel
argued that slight variances between the Convention and the implementing
legislation rendered the Torture Act unconstitutional because it exceeded
the scope of the treaty.89 One key difference between the definition of
torture in the Convention and the Act, he argued, was that "the CAT
requires that 'torture' be committed for some proscribed purpose -
specifically, 'for such purposes as' obtaining information, punishing,
intimidating, or coercing a person . . . whereas the Torture Act does not
require the government to prove the defendant's motive."9 0 Emmanuel's
position emphasized the importance of the prohibited purpose element of
specific intent to torture under the Convention, and its supposed absence
in the U.S. implementing statute.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals responded to the argument
regarding textual differences by noting that legislation implementing a
treaty clearly bears "a 'rational relationship' to that treaty where the
legislation 'tracks the language of the [treaty] in all material respects."'9 1 It
prison or other excessive force, or private actions under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit, in July 2010, explained that Emmanuel was the "first individual to be
prosecuted under the Torture Act." United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010).





87. Id. at *5 (The arguments raised include: Congress lacks constitutional authority to pass the
Torture Act or apply laws extraterritorially; the prosecution violates sovereign immunity; the Torture
Act is unconstitutionally vague; and the application of the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
88. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 793. The jury at the trial level was instructed that defendant must have
"committed an act with the specific intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. "Id. at 822.
89. Id. at 803.
90. Id. In his appeal, Emmanuel also argued that the Torture Act was unconstitutional on many
grounds.
91. Id. at 806 (quoting United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cit. 1998)). The Eleventh Circuit
held that "the Torture Act tracks the provisions of the CAT in all material respects." Id. First,
as courts have recognized in the context of other federal statutes that adopt the CAT's
definition of torture, the CAT independently requires that torture be committed
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looked to a congressional understanding of specific intent in the
Convention and concluded that Congress had combined the intent and
purpose inquiry. It further concluded that the differences between the
Convention and the Torture Act were not material:92
The congressional definition of torture contained in the Torture
Act fully embodies the considerations that the CAT's "for such
purposes" language is intended to "reinforce." Congress properly
understood the thrust of this language to require intentionality on
the part of the torturer . . .. The Torture Act in no way eliminates
or obfuscates the intent requirement contained in the offense of
torture; instead, the Act makes that requirement even clearer by
stating that the proscribed acts must have been "specifically
intended" to result in torture.93
Having dispensed with this and other grounds for appeal on the
constitutionality of the Torture Act, the court upheld Emmanuel's
conviction. 94 Therefore, in the only criminal prosecution under the
Torture Act to date, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that the Torture Act
adopts the same substantive standard of intent as the Convention. This
decision thus once again reinforces the conclusion that the U.S. specific
intent standard mirrors the specific intent standard of the Convention.
C Specific Intent to Torture in U.S. Immigration Law and the Alien Tort
Statute
Because so little domestic jurisprudence on the meaning of torture
under Article 1 of the Convention exists, it is instructive to examine U.S.
jurisprudence on torture in removal proceedings under the Immigration
and Nationality Act and in civil actions under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)95 and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).96 These cases
"intentionally," CAT art. 1(1), and the "for such purposes" language serves only to
"reinforce" that requirement .... The "for such purposes" language is meant merely "to
illustrate the common motivations that cause individuals to engage in torture ... [and to]
ensure[ I that, whatever its specific goal, torture can occur ... only when the production of
pain is purposive, not merely haphazard.
Id. at 807 (quoting Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
92. Id. at 807.
93. Id. at 807-08.
94. The court also repeated the facts that supported the finding of torture under the other
elements of the crime: "The torture he is alleged to have committed was undertaken for a particular
purpose (to intimidate any possible dissenters to his father's regime and extract information from
them), caused severe physical and mental pain and suffering, and was perpetrated while he was acting
in an official capacity." Id. at 804 n.4.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
96. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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help to develop an understanding of both the intent standard as applied
and the evidence required to demonstrate that intent. The extensive
jurisprudence on removal proceedings provides the most detailed analysis
of intent to torture. Courts in these contexts have declined to find intent
to inflict pain or suffering in cases involving willful blindness or deliberate
indifference and have generally declined to find torture when pain and
suffering arises from lawful sanctions.97 These immigration cases differ
from the international case law in only one respect: They appear to apply a
stricter approach to proof of intent to torture, for example, declining to
infer specific intent from circumstances in which an individual reasonably
anticipates experiencing pain or suffering after removal but where there is
no direct evidence that the pain or suffering is likely to be inflicted on that
particular individual for a prohibited purpose. That difference in approach
may arise out of the distinctive context in which the claims of torture arise
in removal proceedings - including the uniquely prospective nature of the
inquiry.
The remaining domestic case law appears to be in even closer
agreement with the international jurisprudence. In civil suits concerning
past torture under the Alien Tort Statute, U.S. courts have applied the
same intent standard and have inferred torture from a totality of the
circumstances, based on factual allegations of severe pain and suffering,
official involvement, and a prohibited purpose.
1. The Immigration and Naionality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act implemented the Convention's
Article 3 requirement not to expel, return, or extradite an individual to a
country "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture."98 The associated federal
regulations define torture, for the purpose of removal proceedings, by
incorporating the "definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture, subject to the reservations, understandings,
declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution
in support of ratification of the Convention."99 The regulations further
97. Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. The implementing legislation prohibits return of an individual where "it is more likely than
not" that he will be tortured. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-227, 5 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822. The applicable regulations are found at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16,
208.18 (2010). The "more likely than not" standard is based on the U.S. government's interpretation
of Article 3, as articulated in its Reservation; other countries employ different standards, such as
foreseeability or the establishment of "substantial grounds." Cordula Droege, Transfer of Detainees:
Legal Framework, Non-Refoulement, and Contemporay Challenges, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 679 (2008).
99. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a); see also United States Policy With Respect to Involuntary Return of
Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, subdiv. B, tit. XXII,§ 2242(f)(2), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)) ("Except as otherwise
[Vol. 52:791
TORTURED REASONING
specify a specific intent standard: "In order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering. An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of
pain and suffering is not torture."100 As in the Convention, the severe pain
or suffering must also have been inflicted
for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or
she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.1o'
The case law interpreting this obligation not to remove individuals to a
country where they will be tortured applies the same standard of specific
intent as the international courts and tribunals, but adopts a stricter
approach to inferring intent from the facts and circumstances. U.S.
immigration tribunals have found dispositive the same criteria as those
employed by international tribunals - intent to inflict severe pain and
suffering, official sanction, and a proscribed purpose. To avoid removal,
however, a successful CAT claim requires showing that it is more likely
than not that the individual resisting removal will be targeted or singled
out for torture.102 This arises from the fact that in immigration cases, the
torture at issue has not yet occurred - the courts must instead assess the
likelihood that the individual before the court will be tortured if returned
to her country of origin. In this way, the jurisprudence is distinctive from
provided, the terms used in this section have the meanings given those terms in the Convention,
subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States
Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention."). The regulations also specify that torture "does
not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," 8 C.F.R. 5 208.18(a)(2), it "does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,"( 208.18(a)(3), and it includes only certain forms of "mental pain or suffering," § 208.18(a)(4).
100. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
101. Id. § 208.18(a)(1).
102. See Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 09-70460, 2010 WL 3297268, 5 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2010);
Mark R. von Sternberg, Outne of United States Asylum Law: Substantive Criteria and Procedural Concerns,
201 PLI/NY 33, 77 (2010) ("[The intent of the individual actually imposing torture must be not
merely deliberate, but undertaken with a view to imposing torture on the victim as the member of a
specific class."); see also Guang Zou v. Mukasey, 266 F. App'x 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding lack of
evidence of torture due to membership in a large class of persons); Liu v. Mukasey, No. 07-1983-ag,
2008 WL 45283, at *1-2 (2d Cit. Jan 3, 2008) (finding lack of evidence of torture due to membership
in a large class of persons). For immigrants who fear female genital mutilation, the Fourth Circuit has
found that persecution could not be based on a fear of psychological harm alone. See Niang v.
Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 2007) (upholding removal, refusing petition based on fear of
female genital mutilation of daughter).
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other cases in which courts assess claims of torture - where the court
may assess evidence of events that have occurred rather than events that
may occur in the future.
The targeting requirement is extensively explicated in a line of cases
addressing deportations of criminals to Haiti. Under U.S. immigration law,
aliens convicted of certain crimes are subject to removal from the United
States. Up until 2000, Haitian policy had been to detain any Haitian
deported for having committed crimes in another country and then to
release them shortly thereafter. 103 In 2000, Haiti "began to hold deportees
with no timetable for their release."1 04 Criminal deportees to Haiti
thereafter faced the prospect of being detained indefinitely in police
holding cells. 105 Conditions in the prisons are - as one court succinctly
put it - "awful."10 6 In a long line of Article 3 non-refoulement cases
regarding Haiti's policy of indefinite detention of criminal deportees,
courts have been reluctant to find torture arising out of lawful sanctions,
even if those detentions have foreseeable consequences of severe pain and
suffering resulting from generally deplorable prison conditions. The U.S.
domestic implementing legislation of the Convention prohibits returning a
person to another state where there are "substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."10 7 A central
question confronting the courts in these cases, therefore, was whether
imprisonment in generally deplorable prison conditions could constitute
torture.
In order to answer this question, U.S. courts first had to decide whether
Haitian indefinite detention policy could be considered "lawful."108 The
courts looked for, but did not find, intent to inflict pain or suffering
beyond that which is "inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" - an
express exemption to the definition of torture, as noted in Part 1.109 While
acknowledging that individuals had provided extensive information about
deplorable Haitian prison conditions, the courts concluded that Haiti's
detention policy in general was a lawful sanction implemented for a
103. This history is described by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Pierre v. Gongales, 502
F.3d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007).
104. Id. at 112.
105. Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1177 (11th Cit. 2004) (noting that the Board of Immigration
Appeals had found that "indefinite detention of criminal deportees by itself is not torture").
106. Pierre, 502 F.3d at 112.
107. CAT, supra note 10, art. 3.
108. Id. art. 1 (noting that torture "does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanctions").
109. Id.; see also Al-Saher v. I.N.S., 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding torture as Al-
Saher "suffered severe beatings and was burned with cigarettes over an 8 to 10 day period. These are
not practices 'inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction.' These actions were specifically intended by
officials to inflict severe physical pain.").
814 [Vol. 52:791
TORTURED REASONING
legitimate purpose." 0 Having concluded the Haitian detention policy was
lawful, the courts determined that merely being subjected to substandard
prison conditions did not constitute torture."'
The courts grappled, however, with whether a prohibited purpose and
intent to torture may nonetheless be demonstrated in cases involving
deplorable prison conditions. Over the past decade, courts upheld, and
then overturned, a definition of specific intent that merely excluded
unintended severe pain and suffering. Courts have offered and abandoned
a definition of specific intent that allowed for torture to be proven through
evidence of willful blindness. The courts struggled, in particular, with the
specific intent requirement for torture in the context of immigrants facing
presumptively lawful, though extremely harsh, prison conditions in their
home countries.1 12
Starting with the seminal decision of In re J-E-, U.S. courts have
proposed and rejected different formulations of intent. The Board of
Immigration Appeals in In re J-E- held that detaining deportees, with
knowledge of substandard prison conditions in Haiti, did not amount to
torture, as there was no evidence that Haitian authorities deliberately
created the prison conditions in order to inflict torture on the petitioner.113
Three years later, in Auguste v. Ridge, the Third Circuit reiterated that "for
an act to constitute torture, there must be a showing that the actor had the
intent to commit the act as well as the intent to achieve the consequences
of the act, namely the infliction of the severe pain and suffering." 114 As the
facts of Auguste were indistinguishable from those of In re J-E-, the
petitioner's claim was denied.115 The courts struggled with evidence very
loosely linking prison officials to any individual prisoner, in contrast to the
evidence of personal infliction of pain and suffering presented to
110. Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1193.
111. See Castel v. Att'y Gen., 295 F. App'x 492 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding Piere v. Gonqales); Cruz
v. Mukasey, No. 07-1394-ag, 2008 WL 45267 (2d Cit. Jan. 3, 2008) (upholding In rej-E- and Piee v.
Gonzales); Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding In rej-E-, reminding that
unintended consequences are not prohibited under the Convention and stating that this unfortunate
and unintended consequence was the result of the Haitian policy "of imprisoning ex-convicts who
are deported to Haiti in order to reduce crime"); Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121-22 (upholding In re J-E-);
Lavira v. Att'y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 167 (3d Cit. 2007) (finding that generally poor prison conditions
are not sufficient to support a likelihood of torture); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145-46 (3d Cir.
2005) (upholding In re f-E- and explaining that detention in deplorable prison conditions is not
torture as the individual had not demonstrated that he, in particular, will be the target of the infliction
of severe pain and suffering); Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1178 (noting that detentions were motivated by
Haiti's desire for "immigration control and public safety"); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 223 F. Supp. 2d
343 (D. Mass. 2002) (upholding In ref-E-); In ref-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
112. See Pierre, 502 F.3d at 119 n.8 (arguing that purpose must be isolated from specific intent, as
detention is by its nature designed to punish).
113. In ref-E-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 304.
114. Auguste, 395 F.3d at 145-46.
115. Id. at 154.
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international courts and tribunals. Once again, this difference arose of
necessity from the different context in which torture was considered: in
the immigration context, after all, the courts are asked to determine a
likelihood of future torture rather than to assess evidence of torture that
has already occurred.
The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits raised and rejected various tests
for a finding of specific intent to torture. In 2007, in Pierre v. Gongales,116
the Second Circuit declined to agree with the Third Circuit's earlier
speculations in Lavira v. Atorny General that willful blindness or deliberate
indifference could suffice to show specific intent to torture. The petitioner,
a diabetic who suffered from hypertension, feared a diabetic coma, stroke,
or death in a Haitian holding cell without access to proper food and
medicine.' 17 The Second Circuit found that the specific intent was not "an
impermissible narrowing of the CAT,""18 and found no reason to disturb
the immigration judge's conclusion that Pierre would likely receive
medicines from his family and be released in a timely fashion.119 In dicta,
the court eschewed any claim that it was raising the evidentiary bar for
claimants.120 It appears that it was correct; its rejection of the willful
blindness standard for establishing intent was entirely consistent with
international case law on intent to torture.
In 2008, in Pierre v. Attorney General,121 the Third Circuit also ruled out
the possibility that torture could be demonstrated through evidence of
willful blindness. The petitioner was "restricted to a liquid-only diet
because of a self-imposed injury to his esophagus." He argued that "the
prison officials' knowledge that it is practically certain that he will suffer
severe pain if imprisoned in Haiti is sufficient for a finding of specific
116. Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118 (referring to this view expressed in Latira v. Att'y Gen., 478 F.3d 158,
171 (3d Cir. 2007), and Thelemaque v. Asheroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215 (D. Conn. 2005) - neither of
which relied on willful blindness or negligence for a finding of torture).
117. Pierre, 502 F.3d at 112. The Second Circuit noted that the Convention is "not solely or
predominantly concerned with immigration and refoulement," and expressed great deference for the
political branches and their efforts to achieve domestic compliance in eradicating torture. Id. at 113-
14.
118. The Second Circuit disagreed, given the Senate's express ratification understanding on
specific intent. Id. at 116.
119. Id. at 121.
120. Id. at 118 n.6 ("That said, nothing in this opinion prevents the agency from drawing the
inference, should the agency choose to do so, that a particular course of action is taken with specific
intent to inflict severe pain and suffering if it is found on the record evidence that the actor is aware
of a virtual certainty that such pain and suffering will result."). Later, the Second Circuit noted that
"torture as commonly understood and practiced is not subtle, elusive, or easy to misconstrue, and the
torturer's intentions are rarely if ever obscure.") Id. at 119.
121. Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2008) ("We also stated in Lavira, in dicta,
that we could not 'rule out' that specific intent could be proven through 'evidence of willful
blindness.' As discussed below, we now rule out that possibility." (citation omitted)).
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intent to torture under the CAT."122 The government countered that "the
jailer's knowledge that an action might cause severe pain and suffering is
not sufficient for a finding of specific intent."1 23 The Third Circuit
ultimately held that Pierre was "unable to sustain his burden of proof to
show that, by imprisoning him, the Haitian authorities ha[d] the specific
intent to torture him."1 24 Pierre had not met his burden, as he had not
demonstrated the Haitian authorities specifically intended him to
experience severe pain and suffering for a proscribed purpose.125
However, in Auguste v. Ridge, the court left open the possiblity that "[i]f
there is evidence that authorities are placing an individual in such
conditions with the intent to inflict severe pain and suffering on that
individual, such an act may rise to the level of torture."126
The Third Circuit proceeded to further examine what degree of intent is
required in order to obtain relief under the Convention. It began by noting
that Pierre did not allege that, if returned to Haiti, he would be imprisoned
for any of the specific prohibited purposes, such as "to obtain information
or a confession," "to punish him," "to intimidate or coerce him," or "for
any discriminatory reason." 127 "Rather," the court explained, "Pierre will
be imprisoned because the Haitian government has a blanket policy of
imprisoning ex-convicts who are deported to Haiti in order to reduce
crime." 128 Any suffering he therefore would experience is an "unfortunate
but unintended consequence of the poor conditions in the Haitian
prisons." Such "an unintended consequence is not," the court concluded
"the type of proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT."1 29
In removal cases, the courts have settled on evidence of targeting for a
proscribed purpose as the way to distinguish torture from other cruel
122. Id. at 182-83.
123. Id. at 183.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 191. This was in contrast with the petitioner in Laira, who presented evidence that he
would be singled out by guards due to his HIV-positive status. Id. at 188.
126. Id at 188 (quoting Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 154 (3d Cir. 2005)). Most recently, in
Cheichel v. Holder, the Eighth Circuit rejected its own earlier language about the possibility of showing
specific intent due to foreseeability of harm. Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1016 (8th Cit.
2010). The Eighth Circuit reiterated that in order to have specific intent an "actor must intend both
the prohibited act and its prohibited consequences." Id. at 1013.
127. Auguste, 295 F.3d. at 189.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court goes on to state that mere proof of knowledge on the part of government
officials does not satisfy the specific intent requirement: "Rather, we are persuaded by the discussion
in Auguste that the specific intent requirement . .. requires a petitioner to show that his prospective
torturer will have the motive or purpose to cause him pain or suffering." Id. Although this might be
read to endorse the view that infliction of pain or suffering is only torture if it is the purpose of the
perpetrator to inflict pain or suffering - that is, that the pain or suffering is itself the aim - it is best
read in context to endorse the standard view that the pain or suffering must be knowingly inflicted
for a proscribed pupose - e.g., coercion, punishment, or intimidation.
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treatment. 130 In the United States, an individual only has a viable non-
refoulement claim if he or she can prove why they would be "individually and
intentionaly singled out for harsh treatment" - for example, as a result of
advanced AIDS.131 One claimant successfully resisted removal by
demonstrating evidence of likely targeting: He "had a valid claim because
he presented evidence that showed that he would be targeted, such as
being singled out by the guards because of his HIV-positive status."l32
Even in rejecting claims, the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit both
noted that evidence of targeting would bring a claimant closer to proving
specific intent.133 In addition, a line of unpublished decisions of the Board
of Immigration Appeals finds torture if, as a result of a special
vulnerability, such as a physical or mental condition, a criminal deportee
would be targeted by guards or by other inmates.134 The jurisprudence
130. Cf infra Section III.A, on evidence of individual complaints before the Committee Against
Torture. The Committee also investigated allegations of systematic torture in Brazilian prisons.
There, the Committee found both severity and proscribed purpose to be lacking. See infra Section
III.C.
131. Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
132. Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lawira v. Att) Gen., 478 F.3d
158, 171 (3d Cir. 2007)).
133. See Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that evidence of
targeting, which was not present in In re ]-E- or in this case, would get a petitioner closer to
demonstrating specific intent); Auguste, 395 F.3d at 154 ("[W]e are not adopting a per se rule that
brutal and deplorable prison conditions can never constitute torture. To the contrary, if there is
evidence that authorities are placing an individual in such conditions with the intent to inflict severe
pain and suffering on that individual, such an act may rise to the level of torture should the other
requirements of the Convention be met.") (emphasis added).
134. In the Matter of Bristout Bourguignon, BIA A041-055-090, Mar. 10, 2009 (unpublished
decision) (noting that the respondent was on anti-psychotic medication, the lack of which would
likely cause him to have a psychotic break in prison. The respondent established that he is unlikely to
receive medication while in prison, and his resulting behavior will increase the possibility of
mistreatment); In the Matter of J-P-Z-, BIA A45-481-814, June 17, 2008 (unpublished decision)
(properly concluding that "(1) prison authorities are more likely than not to deprive the respondent
of medication, (2) he would, more likely than not, suffer a significant behavioral breakdown if
deprived of his mediation ... ,(3) such a breakdown would, more likely than not, bring him to the
unwelcome attention of prison guards, resulting in his torture"). The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) then noted that "specific intent is found in expert testimony that criminal detainees are
"intentionally subjected to life threatening prison conditions for the purpose of extortion." Id. Two
years earlier, the BIA found that "the respondent had met the burden of proof to demonstrate
"specific intent" through intentional physical abuse:
[The] decision hinged on the fact that it would be "highly unlikely" that mentaly ill inmates
would receive required medications in jail. If true, these inmates would be unable to control
their behavior, thereby attracting increased attention from prison guards. This increased
attention, in turn, would mean that it was more likely than not that unmedicated mentally ill
inmates would be subjected to even harsher than normal prison conditions.
In the Matter ofJ-D-, BIA A37-320-280, Apr. 5, 2006 (unpublished decision). Two years before that,
the BIA found that given the unlikelihood of receiving medication and the likelihood that a
schizophrenic state will manifest itself in prison, it is "highly probable that [the petitioner] will be
singled out and tortured or killed by prison guards." In the Matter of B-A-, BIA, A78-409-216, Aug.
19, 2004 (unpublished decision).
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regarding removal proceedings indicates that if pain and suffering is
"inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,"135 petitioners must
demonstrate the likelihood of personally targeted severe pain and suffering
for a prohibited purpose. In other words, a petitioner's evidence of being
personally singled out for mistreatment that results in severe pain or
suffering appears to provide the courts with indicia of specific intent on
the part of the prison officials.
The emphasis on individual targeting in the immigration cases is likely
due to a number of unique contextual factors. First and foremost, the
cases involve instances of torture that have not yet occurred. Hence, an
immigrant facing detention must show that he reasonably fears that he will
suffer a future act of torture, not simply point to "awful" conditions that
affect large numbers of similarly situated persons. Second, the applicants in
these cases are usually immigrants facing removal after a criminal
conviction. 136 Indeed, immigration removal has become an important
means of law enforcement in the United States, perhaps leaving courts
wary to intervene. 137 Applicants are often already imprisoned due to their
criminal conviction, and are subject to mandatory detention pending the
litigation of their cases.138 Hence, continued detention may not appear as
burdensome as it might in another context. Finally, it is important to bear
in mind that courts receive hundreds of non-refoulement claims per year.
Courts are therefore not likely to be eager to find exceptions to what
would otherwise be lawful deportation. The requirement of evidence of
individual targeting may therefore be due in large part to the particular
context of immigration claims seeking relief from removal.139
For all these differences, the U.S. courts' approach to specific intent to
torture in the immigration context nonetheless is otherwise entirely
consistent with the approach defined in the Convention and applied by the
135. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1; Pierre, 502 F.3d at 119 n.8.
136. Compare Pierre, who "broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend and stabbed her repeatedly
with a meat cleaver," Pierre, 528 F.3d at 183, nith plaintiff Dianna Ortiz, who was a nun in Guatemala,
Ortiz v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 173 (D. Mass. 1995).
137. During the 1996 immigration reforms, for example, lawful immigrants were excluded from
many public benefits programs, but the U.S. government did not restrict immigrant admission.
Instead, it made it easier to remove non-citizens by expanding the definition of aggravated felony to
include minor offenses, suggesting a heightened desire to expand control over the immigrant
population in exchange for allowing immigration to remain at already high levels. Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodiguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 517, n.210 (2010); see also
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39
CONN. L. REv. 1827, 1827 (2007) (discussing the use of immigration law as a crinminal enforcement
strategy).
138. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1226(c) (1996), 8 C.F.R. 5 236.1(c) (2007).
139. In this respect, it is possible that the United States is not distinctive. It in fact may be the
case that other countries in their non-refoulement jurisprudence have also adopted a different approach
to interpreting torture than they do in instances where a plaintiff is bringing a criminal law claim
against the torturer him. That inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, however.
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Committee and other international courts and tribunals. In the
immigration jurisprudence, the U.S. courts' interpretation of the intent
standard for torture mirrors the approach adopted by U.S. courts in other
contexts and by international bodies: The specific intent requirement for
torture is met by evidence that pain or suffering will be knowingly inflicted
on an individual for a proscribed purpose.
2. The Alien Tort Statute
There is significant domestic jurisprudence interpreting torture in the
context of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS, originally enacted in
1789, provides that the federal courts "shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."140 When an alien sues for
damages under the ATS, domestic courts, much like the international
tribunals, have applied the specific intent standard and have inferred intent
from the facts and circumstances, including the severity of the pain and
suffering, the nature of official action, and the evidence of a prohibited
purpose.
The seminal case on the ATS, Filirtiga v. Pedia-Irala, decided before the
Convention had been ratified by the United States, held that "the torturer
has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani
geners, an enemy of all mankind."141 Pefia had been the Inspector General
of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. Filirtiga alleged that Pefia had tortured
and murdered his son. The basis for this allegation included "evidence
[from the decedent's sister] of three independent autopsies demonstrating
that her brother's death 'was the result of professional methods of
torture."' 142 In Fikirtga, the Second Circuit reiterated the factual allegations
of torture, official involvement, and the purpose of retaliation for political
beliefs.143 Intent is mentioned by the court twice in reciting the definition
of torture, but never separately addressed.144 The allegations of severe pain
and suffering, official action, and a prohibited purpose were enough for
the Second Circuit to find intent and therefore find civil liability for
torture.
The Supreme Court also addressed the definition of torture in Sosa v.
Alvare-Machain.145 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials had
identified Alvarez-Machain, a physician, as having participated in the
140. 28 U.S.C. 5 1350 (2006).
141. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 878.
143. Id.
144. Id at 883.
145. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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torture and murder of a DEA agent. Unable to persuade Mexico to
extradite him, the DEA hired Mexican nationals
to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United States for trial. As so
planned, a group of Mexicans, including petitioner Jose Francisco
Sosa, abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a
motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where
he was arrested by federal officers.146
The Supreme Court found that a single illegal detention for less than one
day did not violate a well-defined norm of customary international law
against torture, and therefore could not be found to be torture. 147 This
holding comes at the end of the case and is not articulated in any detail.
Thus, in both Fildrtiga and in Sosa, the courts took an approach similar to
that of international tribunals considering allegations of torture: To
establish specific intent, they looked for evidence that pain and suffering
had been inflicted for a prohibited purpose.
3. The Torture Victim Protection Act
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) offers a third body of
jurisprudence that demonstrates the U.S. interpretation of the prohibition
on torture. U.S. courts have dismissed claims due to the lack of a
connection between defendants and the conduct of state officials,'4 8 or
due to the defendant's failure to act under the color of foreign law.149 They
have never dismissed a claim under the TVPA due solely to the absence of
a specific intent.
The TVPA creates a cause of action against "[a]n individual who, under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation ... subjects an individual to torture."1 50 Torture under the TVPA is
defined as a specific intent crime similar to that of the Convention:
146. Id. at 698.
147. Id. at 738 ("It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by
the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."). The
Court held that Sosa had not offered enough support for the proposition that arbitrary detentions
contravened customary international law:
Alvarez thus invokes a general prohibition of 'arbitrary' detention defined as officially
sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of
some government, regardless of the circumstances. Whether or not this is an accurate
reading of the Covenant, Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a
binding customary norm today.
Id. at 736. Sosa referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, not the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 734.
148. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007).
149. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
150. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, § 2(a) & (a)(1)
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Any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain
or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual
or a third person information or a confession, punishing that
individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.15
In assessing intent, the courts in TVPA cases have examined whether
pain and suffering were knowingly inflicted for a prohibited purpose. For
example, in Price v. Socialist People's libyan Arab Jamahiriya, two American
citizens alleged that they had been arrested and kept in a political prison in
Libya "for the purpose of demonstrating Defendant's support of the
government of Iran which held hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
Iran."152 The District of Columbia Circuit held that "[s]uch motivation [of
expressing support with Iranian hostage taking] does not satisfy the
Convention's intentionality requirement."153 The court thus found that
there was no intent to inflict pain and suffering for a prohibited purpose.
The courts have found torture in cases where the acts inflicted pain and
suffering for a prohibited purpose. For example, courts have found torture
where there were "visible signs of torture"154 on the body of a political
leader who had been abducted and killed, "beatings, unsanitary conditions,
inadequate food and medical care, and mock executions" of a person taken
hostage and later killed, 55 and threats of physical torture, "such as cutting
off ... fingers, pulling out . .. fingernails," and electric shocks to the
testicles.156 In these cases, the courts generally do not separately discuss
specific intent or seek direct evidence of intent, instead inferring it from
the circumstances. 157 In the TVPA cases, as in the ATS and immigration
cases, U.S. courts have found the specific intent standard met where pain
or suffering is knowingly inflicted for a prohibited purpose.
(1992).
151. Id. § 3(b)(1).
152. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
153. Id. at 94. The court also held that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient detail regarding the
severity of the beatings to support a finding in their favor. Id. at 93-94.
154. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cit. 2009).
155. Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 699 F. Supp. 2d 136, 152 (D.D.C. 2010).
156. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d. 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2001).
157. Ortiz v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) ("1 find [the factual allegations]
more than sufficient to establish that Gramajo did under color of law (by his order and command)
subject Ortiz to torture . . . .").
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III. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
In this Part, we examine the Committee Against Torture's jurisprudence
on torture as developed in complaints proceedings, concluding
observations to country reports, and special inquiries. Throughout these
documents and decisions, the Committee has consistently applied the
specific intent standard and concluded that particular acts - for example,
beatings by law enforcement officials - constituted torture, and thereby
implied that the intent requirement was satisfied. In each case, the
Committee found torture based on the knowing infliction of pain or
suffering for a prohibited purpose - the same specific intent standard
applied by international courts and tribunals and U.S. courts. Moreover,
the Committee, like all other bodies to have considered the question in the
context of acts already committed, arrived at this finding without requiring
direct evidence of mens rea, but instead by inferring the requisite specific
intent from the facts and circumstances of the case.
A. Complaints
The majority of individual complaints filed before the Committee have
centered on Article 3 claims of prohibited refoulement.158 In four separate
complaint proceedings, however, the Committee dealt specifically with
claims of Article 1 torture, and in all four it concluded that torture
occurred. Three of the proceedings - Dragan Dimitrtjevic, Dimitrov, and
Danilo Dimitrijevic, all involving Serbia and Montenegro - led to the
Committee's first findings of torture in response to individual
complaints.' 59 All three complainants were filed by Serbian citizens of
Roma origin who were beaten by police in connection with the
investigation of a crime. And in all three instances, the Committee inferred
intent based on the circumstances presented. In the fourth complaint, Ali
v. Tunisia, a French-Tunisian woman claimed she was beaten and detained
because of statements she made to a clerk working in a Tunisian court.
The Committee again inferred intent based on the facts and circumstances
surrounding Ali's beatings and detention. Finally, in a fifth complaint
involving a non-Article 1 claim in Rios v. Canada, the Committee applied a
similar intent analysis, determining that, given his scars and wounds, Rios
likely had been subjected to torture by the Mexican military.160 The
158. Article 3 prohibits expelling, returning, or extraditing individuals to a state where "there are
substantial grounds for believing that [the complainant] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture." CAT, supra note 10, art. 3. These complaints consequently focus on the likelihood that
torture would occur if a person were transferred to another state, not whether torture has in fact
occurred. Sarah Joseph, Committee Against Torture: Recent Jurisprudence, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 571, 574
(2006).
159. Joseph, supra note 158, at 571.
160. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 8.6, U.N. Doc.
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Committee has thus consistently concluded that acts of torture occurred
where the facts and circumstances demonstrated the knowing infliction of
pain and suffering for a prohibited purpose.
In Dragan Dimitjevic v. Serbia and Montenegro,161 police officers
handcuffed the complainant to a radiator and later a bicycle. While the
complainant was incapacitated, several officers hit him with a metal bar
and their nightsticks and "kicked and punched him all over his body while
insulting his ethnic origins and cursing his 'gypsy mother."' 162 The
Committee determined that the Dimitrijevic's treatment while in detention
could be "characterized as severe pain or suffering intentionally inflicted
by public officials in the context of the investigation of a crime." 63
Consequently, the Committee held "that the facts ... constituted torture
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention." 64 The Committee did
not separately analyze intent; instead, it inferred intent from the intentional
infliction of pain and suffering for the purpose of advancing the
investigation of an alleged crime.
In Dimitrov v. Serbia and Montenegro,'65 Dimitrov was arrested and taken
to a police station without explanation. During his interrogation, the police
"struck [Dimitrov] repeatedly with a baseball bat and a steel cable, and
kicked and punched him all over his body" for thirteen hours.166 Dimitrov
lost consciousness multiple times during these beatings.167 The Committee
determined that Serbia and Montenegro had committed torture, based in
part on the "severe pain or suffering intentionally inflicted [on Dimitrov]
by public officials in the context of the investigation of a crime." 68
Without explicitly discussing intent, the Committee concluded that this
pain or suffering amounted to "torture within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Convention." 69 The Committee again found intent to torture based on
the nature and purpose of the police beatings the victim experienced.
In Danilo Dimitnrjevic v. Serbia and Montenegro,170 the complainant was
arrested without a warrant and taken to a police station, where he was
forced to strip to his underwear. A presumed plain-clothes officer then
CAT/C/33/D/133/1999 (Nov. 23, 2004).
161. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Dragan Dimirtrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro, U.N. Doc.










170. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Danilo Dimitrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro, 2.1, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/35/D/172/2000 (Nov. 16, 2005).
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handcuffed him to a metal bar and beat Dimitrijevic with a metal club for
roughly one hour.'7' The police left Dimitrijevic in the room where he had
been beaten for three full days, refusing to provide him access to food,
water, a lavatory, or a doctor.172 The Committee noted that the
complainant's description of his detention and beating could be
characterized as severe pain or suffering intentionally inflicted by
public officials for such purposes as obtaining from him
information or a confession or punishing him for an act he has
committed, or intimidating or coercing him for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind in the context of the investigation of
a crime.173
Without further discussion, the Committee determined that this treatment
constituted torture, again by finding intentional infliction of pain or
suffering for the purpose of advancing the investigation of a crime based
on the circumstances of the case.174
In Ali v. Tunisia,175 the Committee found that the severe physical
injuries and pain inflicted by police officers for the purpose of punishing
and intimidating the victim constituted torture. Saadia Ali, a French-
Tunisian national and resident of France, was visiting Tunisia to help her
brother retrieve a document for his wedding.'76 While accompanying her
brother to a Tunisian court to obtain the document for the ceremony, Ali
got into a dispute with the desk clerk, during which she stated, "If you
want to know the truth, it's thanks to us that you are here."177 The clerk
asked for her papers and requested that she accompany him to see the
Vice President of the court.178 She was taken to another room where a
court official interrogated her and requested that she sign a document in
Arabic, which she did not understand, so she refused. 7 9 A police officer
then escorted her to a detention center in the basement of the court. In the
detention center, another guard confronted her, ripped off her scarf and
dress, and beat her severely. 80 After the initial beating, he "took her by the
hair and dragged her to an unlit cell, where he continued punching and
kicking her on the head and body."181 She lost consciousness.1 82 Ali was
171. Id.
172. Id. T 2.2.
173. Id. T 7.1.
174. Id.
175. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Ali v. Tunisia, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/41/D/291/2006 (Nov. 26,
2008).
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brought back to the ground floor, where she was threatened and harassed
by the police. 83 She was asked to sign a document written in Arabic, but
she again refused.184 After she was finally released, Ali filed a complaint
claiming that the ill-treatment to which she was subjected was perpetrated
by state agents and was so severe as to amount to torture.185 The
Committee determined that Tunisian police officers inflicted severe pain
and suffering "deliberately" and "with a view to punishing her for her
words addressed to the registrar of the court of first instance in Tunis and
to intimidating her" - the proscribed purpose.186 Without any additional
discussion of intent, the Committee concluded that Ali had been subjected
to torture.
In the 2004 case of Falcon Rios v. Canada,'87 the Committee determined
that Falcon Rios likely was subjected to torture by the Mexican military; his
primary claim pertained to Article 3 of the Convention and not Article 1.
In particular, the Committee stated that medical reports detailing that
Falcon Rios "bore numerous scars from cigarette burns on various parts
of his body, and scars from knife wounds to both legs" provided
"considerable weight to his allegation that he was tortured during the
interrogations he underwent in a military camp." 188 Although the
Committee was not tasked with determining whether an Article 1 violation
had occurred, the facts of the situation - namely that Rios had scarring
and burns from knife wounds and cigarettes that had likely been inflicted
for the purpose of punishment - provided sufficient evidence for the
Committee to infer specific intent and determine that Rfos had previously
been tortured and thus had reason to fear being subjected to torture if
returned to Mexico.
B. Concluding Observations to Country Reports
In the Committee's concluding observations to country reports from
November 2001 through May 2010, intent to commit torture arose in only






187. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 1.1, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/33/D/133/1999 (Nov. 23, 2004).
188. Id. 8.4.
189. Concluding observations are the Committee's responses to reports filed by individual
countries on the status of their Convention obligations under Article 19 of the Convention. Although
established in 1984, Convention country reports and corresponding concluding observations are
primarily available from November 2001 to the present; more information is available at Committee
Against Torture, http://tinurl.com/bla44w8 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
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voiced concern relating to Colombia's definition of torture. The
Committee stated alarm "about the possibility of erroneous definitions
that assimilate the crime of torture to other less serious criminal offences
such as that of personal injury, which does not require proof of the
offender's intention." 90 The result, the Committee feared, would be
"serious under-recording of cases of torture and entail impunity for the
said crimes (i.e., Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the Convention)." 19 1 In this way, the
Committee indicated that it regarded "the offender's intention" as an
important factor for distinguishing between torture and other lesser
crimes,192 a distinction that affirms the Convention's specific intent
requirement.
In response to Israel's country report in 1997, the Committee's
concluding observation stated the following methods of interrogation all
constituted torture: "(1) restraining in very painful conditions, (2) hooding
under special conditions, (3) sounding of loud music for prolonged
periods, (4) sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including
death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill."193 The
Committee made no separate inquiry into intent, but the implication was
clear: These acts, if committed by or with the acquiescence of public
officials for the purpose of interrogation, are sufficient for the Committee
to establish torture.
C Special Inquiries
The Committee has conducted seven confidential inquiries since its
establishment in 1988.194 In these investigations, the Committee did not
focus on whether particular acts of torture had occurred, but rather on
allegations of systemic torture. Only three - those conducted on Brazil,
190. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/COL/CO/4 (May 4, 2010), available athttp://tinyurl.com/bn9wuhx.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee Against Torture,
257, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Sept. 5, 1997). See also SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., SEEKING REMEDIES FOR
TORTURE VICTIMS: A HANDBOOK ON THE INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES OF THE UN
TREATY BODIES 207 (2006), for findings provided in the concluding observations to the county
report of Yugoslavia in 1999, which unfortunately is not available online. In this report, the
Committee determined that beating by fists and wooden or metallic clubs, mainly on the head, the in
the kidney area, and on the soles of the feet, resulting in mutilations and even death in some cases,
constituted torture in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention.
194. The Committee is empowered to carry out a confidential inquiry if it "receives reliable
information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being
systematically practised in the territory of a State party." CAT, supra note 10, art. 20. More
information on these inquiries is available at Confidential inquiries Under Article 20 of the
Convention Against Torture, supra note 20.
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Mexico, and Turkey - are publicly available. Of these, only the Brazil
inquiry expressly touched upon the question of intent to torture.
In its Brazil inquiry, the Committee examined prisons and detention
centers. The Committee noted "problems of overcrowding and inadequate
conditions of deprivation of freedom," but stated that these arose from "a
complex ensemble of factors," ranging from crime rates to insufficient
public resources. 195 The Committee determined that "it would seem
mistaken to try to equate torture with problematic conditions of
detention," an issue that the Committee claimed Brazil had been trying to
address. 196 "[O]vercrowding and unhealthy conditions," the Committee
continued, "persist .. . despite the best efforts of Brazilian authorities, and
not with their consent or acquiescence." 97 The efforts of the Brazilian
authorities to improve conditions of confinement suggested that, far from
intending to inflict pain or suffering on detainees, the public officials
intended to alleviate problematic conditions. The Committee also stated
that there was no evidence of "severe" pain or suffering or a prohibited
purpose:
The general character of the situation, which affects whole
populations in detention centers, the lack of physical and
psychological aggression against inmates and the absence of
punitive purposes or of obtaining confessions or information
indicate that one cannot identify the special degree of severity and
the absence of the specific purpose that would define torture. This
[is] even more obvious as the State authorities recognize the
problem and endeavor to overcome them.198
The Committee stated, however, that purpose could be found in other
cases even if there is no direct intention to commit torture by the national
government:
Torture may in fact be of a systematic character without resulting
from the direct intention of a Government. It may be the
consequence of factors which the Government has difficulty in
controlling, and its existence may indicate a discrepancy between
policy as determined by the central Government and its
implementation by the local administration. 199
195. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report on Brazil Produced by the Committee Under Article








The Committee thus underscored that government intention is not required
for systematic torture to occur - intention of the perpetrator, whether
national officials, local officials, or private actors who act with the
acquiescence of a public official, is enough. Local administrators, for
example, could abuse detainees, without the national government
intending such abuse, and the actions would constitute torture. Intent still
must be proven in each case, but a national governmental intent to commit
systematic torture is not necessary for a violation of the Convention to be
found.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Torture is a crime within the jurisdiction of several international
tribunals. In particular, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) all have jurisdiction over torture.
Although these tribunals interpret their own statutes, rather than the
Convention Against Torture, their jurisprudence 200 provides further
evidence of the meaning of intent and its relationship to torture as
understood in international law more generally. This is particularly true
because all of these bodies agree that torture has occurred when severe
pain or suffering has been inflicted for a prohibited purpose with official
acquiescence or involvement. In assessing intent, these international courts
and tribunals once again look to the totality of the circumstances.
Moreover, they agree that torture requires a prohibited purpose, whereas
cruel, inhumane and degrading acts do not. This Part's examination of
jurisprudence on torture and intent thus serves to affirm that the United
States understanding of torture is consistent with an internationally applied
specific intent standard for torture under international criminal and human
rights law.
A. The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia
Even though the ICTY's statute does not independently define torture,
the ICTY has jurisdiction over torture because the crime qualifies as both
a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and a crime against
humanity. 201 In Prosecutor v. Anto Furund'ia, the ICTY followed an
200. Other relevant sources of law might include Conventions and their interpretative bodies'
jurisprudence. For example, the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights has examined the question of what constitutes torture based on Article 7 of the
Covenant. See Human Rights Comm., supra note 21.
201. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
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approach much like that of the Committee: It found torture required the
intentional infliction of pain for a prohibited purpose. In employing this
specific intent standard, the ICTY concluded that torture had occurred
without conducting a separate intent analysis.
In Prosecutor v. Furmnd'fa,202 the accused was charged with two counts:
inhumane treatment and torture. The accused was a local commander of a
paramilitary group, and according to the indictment, he had interrogated
two women while several other soldiers beat, threatened, and raped
them.203 The Trial Chamber acknowledged that the Committee's definition
of torture had gained broad international consensus. 204 Nonetheless, it
clarified that, in ICTY jurisprudence, torture
(i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental; in addition
(ii) this act or omission must be intentional;
(iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at
punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a
third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim
or a third person;
(iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict[.]205
The Trial Chamber also distinguished between an accused who assists
in the perpetration of torture and shares in the prohibited purpose and one
who does neither: "Arguably, if the person attending the torture process
neither shares in the purpose behind torture nor in any way assists in its
perpetration, then he or she should not be regarded as criminally
liable . . . ."206 An example of one who would not be criminally liable in
this way would be a "soldier whom a superior has ordered to attend a
torture session in order to determine whether that soldier can stomach the
sight of torture and thus be trained as a torturer."207
Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1994) [hereinafter Statute
of the ICTY]. The relevant articles are Article 2 ("Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949"), specifically section b of Article 2 (listing "torture" and "inhumane treatment") and Article 5
("crimes against humanity), specifically section f of Article 5, listing "torture." Id. arts. 2(b), 5(f).
202. Prosecutor v. Furund'ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
203. Id. T 38.
204. Id. T 161.
205. Id. $ 162 (emphasis added). The ICTY has jurisdiction over serious violations of
international humanitarian law, Statute of the ICTY, supra note 201, art. 1, and in order for
international humanitarian law to apply there must first be an armed conflict. Frand'/a, Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T, Judgment, 258. The ICTY needed to include a link to an armed conflict in the
definition of torture in order to establish jurisdiction over "torture and outrages upon personal
dignity." Id. 259.




The Trial Chamber explained that a judgment of criminal liability for
torture would largely rest on satisfaction of the third element - the
existence of a prohibited purpose:
To determine whether an individual is a perpetrator or co-
perpetrator of torture or must instead be regarded as an aider and
abettor, or is even not to be regarded as criminally liable, it is crucial
to ascertain whether the individual who takes part in the torture
process also partakes of the purpose behind torture (that is, acts with the
intention of obtaining information or a confession, of punishing,
intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or
of discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third
person).208
The Trial Chamber found that specific intent was met by finding that pain
or suffering was inflicted for a prohibited purpose: "[The accused must
participate in an integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose
behind the torture, that is the intent to obtain information or a
confession." 209 In reaching a judgment on the charge of torture, the Trial
Chamber again addressed intention and prohibited purpose in a single
finding: "The intention of the accused ... was to obtain information." 21 0
The majority of the opinion focused on describing the severity of the
victim's pain and suffering.211
On appeal, the accused disputed the Trial Chamber's findings on
torture.212 He pointed to conflicting witness testimony that favored his
account,213 and he claimed that a witness' identification was unreliable.214
Most centrally, he argued that there were sufficient facts to show that the
other soldiers had been the persons inflicting severe pain and suffering,
while the accused had only questioned the victim. 215 In upholding the Trial
Chamber's determination that the accused was guilty of committing
torture, the Appeals Chamber gave heavy weight to the evidence of the
severity of pain and suffering inflicted. The court stated that it was
"inconceivable that it could ever be argued that the acts charged in ... the
Amended Indictment . . , once proven, are not serious enough to amount
to torture." 216 The Court mentioned the intent requirement in the
208. Id.
209. Id. T 257.
210. Id. 265, 267.
211. Id. TI 264, 266.
212. Prosecutor v. Furund'ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, judgment, 80-85 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
213. Id. T 81.
214. Id. T 82.
215. Id. T 84.
216. Id. 114 (rejecting an improper finding of torture as grounds for appeal).
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definition of torture, but it did not independently analyze intent as part of
its findings - suggesting, once again, that the facts and circumstances of
the case allowed the Court to infer that the intent requirement had been
fulfilled.217 Furthermore, by requiring a finding of proscribed purpose, the
ICTY's specific intent standard comports with that of the Convention.
B. The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda
The ICTR has jurisdiction over torture inflicted as part of widespread
or systematic attacks against a civilian population 218 and over torture as a
serious violation of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.219 It
has used the Convention's definition of torture, including its specific intent
standard to elaborate on torture under the ICTR statute,220 which simply
lists torture as one of many crimes against humanity. In Prosecutor v.
Akayesu and in Seman7a v. Prosecutor, the ICTR found torture based on the
severity of injuries intentionally inflicted (such as seeking out a victim) for
a prohibited purpose.
The ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Akayesu commented that "[o]n
the issue of determining the offender's specific intent, the Chamber
considers that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible,
to determine." 22 1 It continued, "[t]his is the reason why, in the absence of a
confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of
presumptions offact."222 The Trial Chamber then listed the acts of Akayesu it
found to constitute torture - including beating or threat to life during an
interrogation - in other words, infliction of pain or suffering for a
prohibited purpose (interrogation).223 On appeal, Akayesu did not raise the
legal or factual conclusions regarding torture as grounds for appeal.224
Later, in Prosecutor v. Seman.a,225 the ICTR Trial Chamber made
reference to ICTY jurisprudence and to the Convention. It emphasized the
importance of intentional infliction of pain and suffering in the service of a
prohibited purpose for a finding of torture. In the Trial Chamber's
discussion of Semanza's liability for torture and murder, the Trial Chamber
217. Similarly, in Pmsecutor v. Delaic, the Trial Chamber recognized three elements as in dispute:
the severity of pain, prohibited purposes, and official sanction. See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1 461, 470, 473. (In'l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
1998).
218. S.C. Res. 955 art. 3(f), U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
219. Id. art. 4(a).
220. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, TT 593, 681 (Sept. 2, 1998).
221. Id. 1 523
222. Id 523 (emphasis added) (discussing genocide rather than torture).
223. Id. TT 682-83.
224. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 10 (June 1, 2001).
225. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, judgment and Sentence, T 342 (May 15,
2003) (stating that the definition of torture in the Convention is not identical to the crime of torture
as a crime against humanity).
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described how Semanza "intentionally inflicted serious injuries" when he
cut off the arm of a man while interrogating him.226 Elaborating on intent
towards this victim, the Trial Chamber found "[t]he intentional nature of
the Accused's conduct is demonstrated by his seeking out Rusanganwa for
questioning and using the machete for inflicting serious injury shortly after
Rusanganwa's negative response to the question." 227 Interrogation served
as the prohibited purpose. Regarding a different victim, the Trial Chamber
focused on the level of pain and suffering inflicted: "Noting, in particular,
the extreme level of fear occasioned by the circumstances surrounding the
event and nature of the rape of Victim A, the Chamber finds that the
perpetrator inflicted severe mental suffering sufficient to form the material
element of torture." 228 The Trial Chamber noted that the accused acted
with intent to discriminate against Tutsis, which is a prohibited purpose. 229
On appeal, the accused claimed that the elements of torture had not
been demonstrated because the Prosecution had not proven that he acted
in an official capacity. 230 The Appeals Chamber was not persuaded by the
challenges to the torture charge, which focused on the credibility of the
witnesses, timing, and detail of evidence against the accused.231 The
Appeals Chamber also emphasized the importance of purpose in a finding
of torture. It distinguished torture from murder: "Torture requires a
specific, enumerated purpose: in this case, to obtain information or a
confession. Murder, on the other hand, requires no such purpose . . . ."232
In both Akayesu and SemanZa, the ICTR found torture where the facts and
circumstances surrounding the infliction of pain and suffering - actions
conducted under official sanction and for a prohibited purpose -
indicated the intent requirement had been met. The reliance on prohibited
purpose by the ICTR mirrors the Convention's use of prohibited purpose
to separate torture from other cruel and inhumane acts; for both the ICTY
and the Convention, a reliance on prohibited purpose is consistent with
torture's status as a specific intent crime where the intent requirement may
be met by a showing of infliction of pain or suffering for a prohibited
purpose.
226. Id. 164, 213.
227. Id. ? 549.
228. Id. 482.
229. Id. 545.
230. Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, 286 (May 20, 2005). The
Appeals Chamber rejected the requirement that the perpetrator must have acted in an official
capacity, explaining that this is only a requirement under the Convention. Id. 1 248 (referring to the
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C The European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR adjudicates violations of the European Convention of
Human Rights.233 Torture is prohibited under the Convention, but not
clearly defined: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."234 The ECtHR has examined alleged
acts of torture and has made an effort to distinguish these actions from
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. It, too, applies the same intent
standard as other international bodies and U.S. courts.
In 1978, before the Convention but after the Declaration Against
Torture, 235 the ECtHR in Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom236 analyzed a
combination of five techniques that the United Kingdom used in
interrogations in Northern Ireland. The ECtHR examined the severity of
suffering and the purpose for which that suffering was inflicted: It
acknowledged that the five techniques were intended to extract a
confession,237 but it stated that torture could be distinguished from cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment "principally from a difference in the
intensity of the suffering inflicted." 238 It concluded that the five techniques
did not rise to the level of intensity or cruelty required to constitute
torture - a separate inquiry from intent and proscribed purpose.
Later, in Aksoy v. Turkey, 239 the ECtHR found both intensity of
suffering and an aim of obtaining information. It inferred intent in part
from the level of preparation the torture would have required:
This treatment could only have been deliberately inflicted: indeed a
certain amount of preparation and exertion would have been
required to carry it out. It would appear to have been administered
with the aim of obtaining admissions or information from the
applicant. In addition to the severe pain which it must have caused
at the time, . . . it led to paralysis of both arms which lasted for
some time. The Court considers that this treatment was of such a
serious and cruel nature that it can only be described as torture. 240
233. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 19-51,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the ECtHR).
234. Id. art. 3.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51 (discussing the Declaration Against Torture).
236. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 96 (1978). The five techniques were
wall-standing (a forced stress position), hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and
deprivation of food and drink.
237. Id. 167.
238. Id.
239. Aksoy v. Turkey (No. 26), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260; see also Aydin v. Turkey (No. 50),
1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1867.
240. Aksqy, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 64 (1996). In addition, in Nevmeryhitsky v Ukraine, the ECtHR found
an almost per se standard of torture. It found that force-feeding, when not medically necessary,
constituted torture under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Nevmerzhitsky v.
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The ECtHR thus joined the other international tribunals in finding specific
intent where the totality of the facts and circumstances showed that pain
and suffering had been inflicted for a prohibited purpose (in this case
interrogation).
D. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The IACHR is charged with investigating violations of the American
Convention on Human Rights. 241 The Convention states that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture." 242 In order to apply this undefined standard,
the IACHR has looked to the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture.243
In Martin de Mejia v. Peri, the IACHR summarized the definition of
torture found in Articles 2 and 3 of the Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture as encompassing three elements:
1. It must be an intentional act through which physical and mental
pain and suffering is inflicted on a person;
2. It must be committed with a purpose;
3. It must be committed by a public official or by a private person
acting at the instigation of the former.244
Martin de Mejia repeatedly had been raped following the abduction of her
husband. The IACHR first described the physical and mental pain and
suffering that resulted from the sexual violence, and explained that "rape
would appear to be a weapon used to punish, intimidate and humiliate." 245
For the second element, the Commission noted that for an act to be
torture it must have been committed intentionally, for example, to produce
"a certain result in the victim," such as personal punishment and
Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. 307, 330 (2005). Intent was not at issue; the applicant asserted that the
purpose of the force-feeding was to humiliate him and to cause severe pain when he resisted, a point
which it does not appear the Court engaged in great detail. Id.
241. Organization of the American States [OAS], Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights art. 41(f, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX.0/79) (1979). Only the IACHR and States Parties may submit a
case to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 61, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights]. Even if a State has acknowledged
liability for torture, the IACtHR may decide on reparations such as medical care and monetary
compensation. See, e.g., Case of Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C)
No. 132, at 51-52 (Sept. 12, 2005) (spelling out reparations that Colombia must make to torture
victims after admitting liability).
242. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 241, art. 5(2).
243. O.A.S., Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 579
(Dec. 9, 1985).
244. Martin de Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 (1996) (emphasis added).
245. Id.
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intimidation.246 The Government of Peru did not dispute the allegations,
arguing only that the case was inadmissible. The IACHR found that the
repeated sexual abuse of de Mejia constituted torture.247 The Commission
thus joined other international bodies in finding the required intent in
circumstances in which the accused public official inflicted severe pain or
suffering to achieve a prohibited purpose.
CONCLUSION
International bodies and U.S. courts are consistent in their approach to
the intent requirement for torture. To prove torture, it is necessary to
show that the accused intentionally inflicted pain or sufferingfor aprobibited
purpose. The requirement of a mens rea element that extends beyond the
actus reus of the action places the crime of torture comfortably in the
company of other specific intent crimes, both domestic and international.
That additional mens rea, moreover, is expressly specified by the
Convention - the pain or suffering must be inflicted for a prohibited
purpose.
In practice, a finding of specific intent does not require direct evidence
of mental state but may instead be deduced from the complete set of facts
and circumstances. The Committee on Torture and international courts
and tribunals all find that torture has occurred when the circumstances as a
whole - including the severity of the pain or suffering inflicted and the
prohibited purpose of the act - indicate that the specific intent
requirement is satisfied. When intent is separately analyzed, it is generally
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient evidence of a
prohibited purpose.
In criminal prosecution, legislative history, and interpretation of torture
in other statutes, U.S. courts have approached intent to torture in precisely
the same way as the Committee and international courts and tribunals.
Like the international bodies, U.S. courts have emphasized the importance
of prohibited purpose in determining whether the specific intent standard
has been met. In the only domestic criminal prosecution to date for the
crime of torture, the Eleventh Circuit described the intent requirement
through reference to actions that reflect a prohibited purpose. The courts
have adopted the same approach to intent in cases involving civil
prosecution of torture under the TVPA and ATS. Although courts
engaged in removal proceedings sometimes engage in a more detailed
discussion of intent, they general do so to establish an individualized
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In sum, the U.S. specific intent standard for torture, as expressed in the
text of statutes, legislative history, and jurisprudence, is indistinguishable
from the specific intent standard expressed in international law. The
standard adopted in the denounced torture memos is not only inconsistent
with international law and practice, but runs directly counter to U.S.
legislative history and U.S. court interpretation of a variety of statutes
prohibiting torture. Given that U.S. law and practice is already consistent
with international law and practice, the U.S. government can and should
publicly reaffirm its full and unreserved commitment to the international
prohibition on torture. Such a declaration would serve to acknowledge and
affirm the United States' commitment to ending torture and punishing
appropriately whenever transgressions arise, thus helping the country
reclaim its moral and legal leadership in this area of international human
rights.
*
